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SYMPOSIUM: RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION*

Lawrence M. Solant
This issue contains the proceedings of a Symposium
held at Brooklyn Law School on October 18, 2002, sponsored by
the Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Law,
Language and Cognition. The Symposium was timely then, and
this issue is timely now. As Dean Joan Wexler said in her
introductory remarks at the Symposium:
Terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and around the
world; war in Iraq; and the disclosure of one financial scandal after
another have forced us all to ask serious questions about blame and
about how to hold wrongdoers responsible for their actions. Perhaps
it is always the case that soul-searching comes at times of crisis.
Clearly, we are at such a point now.
We live under a rule of law, and our legal system purports to
establish through our body of laws just when a person or corporation
has engaged in legally blameworthy conduct, and what should be
done when that happens. An overriding theme of [the Articles
published in this issue] asks a rather frightening question: What
should we do if we learn that people really assign responsibility and
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blame in ways that are different from the ways that the legal system
assumes? Most importantly, we must ask whether adjustments are
necessary to align the legal system with its stated goal of doing
justice.1

In fact, significant advances in social psychology have shown
that people often do assign blame in ways that the legal system
does not take into account, sometimes making it unrealistic to
expect the system to achieve its stated goals.
The Articles in this issue are organized into three
groups. The first addresses the question of how cognitive and
emotional factors contribute to the assignment of blame.
Sharon Lamb argues that fear drives a great deal of moral
attribution. She explores some ramifications of fear-based
condemnation by drawing on the family as a mental model for
blaming and exploring shaming sanctions. Because fear focuses
on the future, Lamb's perspective relates to both retributive
and deterrence models of justice.
Relying upon a somewhat different psychological
literature, Neal R. Feigenson focuses on how emotions and
cognition interact in our modeling of events in the world, and
in attributing moral judgment. Drawing on work in social
psychology, he explores some likely scenarios for the course of
litigation arising out of the World Trade Center attacks.
Feigenson highlights the interactions between emotions and
cognition, which are complex and operate in both directions,
speculating on how this will affect jurors in those 9/11 cases.
My contribution draws on both linguistic and
psychological literatures to examine some of the cognitive
foundations of blaming. It argues that most of the elements of
the impulse to blame are very basic cognitive functions that we
use routinely for purposes that have nothing to do with
assignment of moral responsibility. Their ease of access
explains in part the ease with which we assign blame. Like
Feigenson's contribution, it discusses reactions to 9/11.
The second set of Articles addresses some of the same
issues, in the context of tort law. Anthony J. Sebok's Article
explores the history of blame as the controlling principle in
private litigation. His arguments show that blame, while
perhaps a natural psychological process, has not always
1 Joan G. Wexler, Introductory Remarks at the Brooklyn Law School Center
for the Study of Law, Language & Cognition Symposium, Responsibility & Blame:
Psychological & Legal Perspectives (Oct. 18, 2002).
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dominated tort theory, and is justified by somewhat
contradictory theories. In determining how well the legal
system assigns responsibility, it is necessary to consider the
system's goals, whether they be an attempt to punish in
circumstances that the criminal justice system often ignores, a
somewhat unsatisfactory substitute for social insurance or an
effort to deter careless conduct.
Three other Articles deal with psychological aspects of
blame in the setting of contemporary tort law. Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski examines the reasonable person standard against
some robust findings in the psychological literature, which
show that the system expects more of tort defendants than
should be expected of an ordinary person. Factfinders tend to
overestimate certain cognitive abilities, such as the ability to
perceive change in the environment and the ability to perceive
at the periphery. To the extent that these skills are implicated
in legal disputes, the system is likely to hold blameless people
responsible for harm. Rachlinski explores some of the
consequences of this propensity.
Valerie P. Hans and Juliet Dee examine the
phenomenon of blaming the victim in a classic tort setting:
whiplash. Notwithstanding complaints that juries are biased
against defendants and in favor of plaintiffs, people are very
suspicious of plaintiffs claiming to have suffered from
whiplash. Hans and Dee examine this negative reaction from
both social psychological and political perspectives. For
example, when people identify more with a defendant than
with a victim, they tend to minimize the complaints of those in
the "other" group. Other considerations, such as press coverage
of the tort system, round out their discussion.
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John M. Darley and Robert J.
MacCoun investigate a complicated dynamic embedded in the
allocation of responsibility in civil cases. Factfinders must
evaluate the evidence and make decisions in order to further a
number of goals that sometimes conflict with each other. For
example, if compensating the plaintiff appropriately and seeing
that a defendant gets its just deserts are both goals, then
awarding punitive damages on top of compensatory damages,
which overcompensate plaintiffs, requires that one goal be
placed above the other. Their discussion explains a great deal
of the apparent incoherence in civil litigation.
The final two Articles in this issue come from a
different, very important perspective. The Symposium's title,
"Responsibility and Blame," is open to multiple interpretations.
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One understanding of the expression is that the two conceptsresponsibility and blame-are very similar, perhaps two sides
of the same coin. A decent society should hold blameworthy
people responsible for their actions. Most of the Articles in this
issue adopt that perspective. But there is another way of
looking at these concepts. One can look at responsibility as a
duty to impose on oneself: the duty to act responsibly. Leonard
V. Kaplan's Article analyzes responsibility from just this
perspective. Using Ingmar Bergman's film Shame as a vehicle
for exploring personal responsibility, Kaplan focuses our
attention on failures to take responsibility for the most basic
interpersonal interactions in contemporary society. Academics
are by no means excluded from the critique. Kaplan's Article
relates to Sharon Lamb's in that they both focus on similar
emotional responses and personal experiences in establishing
models of conduct between oneself and others.
The final Article, by Susan Bandes, also plays on our
ability to understand "responsibility" in more than one way.
Bandes turns her attention to misconduct within government.
Because government presumably represents the citizenry,
government has a duty to act responsibly, and should be held
responsible when it does not. But government, like other
entities such as corporations, legislatures and the like, becomes
slippery once something goes wrong. Since government
purports to be a responsible entity (in the sense of acting
responsibly), it eschews responsibility (in the sense of blame)
when a bad actor within the government causes harm by acting
outside this benevolent picture of the public's representatives.
She illustrates this process dramatically with police torture
cases.
As this brief summary of the issue suggests, the Articles
all respond to a few complex, but closely related issues. This is
not always the case when academics are asked to participate in
a symposium with a stated theme. Yet the temporal proximity
of this conference to the 9/11 attacks and the earlier
accomplishments of the participants allowed it to happen here.
I conclude with two notes of thanks. First, Professor
Dan Kahan participated in the conference and provided a great
deal of intellectual stimulation. The Articles published in this
issue are all the better for his contributions. Last, but by no
means least, the concept and structure of the Symposium
benefited greatly from the many valuable discussions that I
had with my colleague, Tony Sebok, throughout the planning of
the event.

